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ket can distort trade and reduce price convergence. We investigate econometrically the impact
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1 Introduction
Interconnectors link two electricity systems and create value by enabling the market with the higher
price to import cheaper electricity from its neighbours. Market coupling makes efficient use of
interconnectors by ensuring higher-price markets import until prices are equated or interconnectors
constrained. Efficient systems dispatch generation units in increasing offer price order, with fossil
plant typically at the margin. A carbon tax increases the cost of fossil generation and we would
expect this to increase prices.
In 2011 the UK government decided to enact a gradually escalating carbon price floor for fossil
generation fuels to make low-carbon generation investment commercially viable. This came into
effect in April 2013 and took the form of a carbon tax (the carbon Price Support, CPS, an addition
to the EU carbon price, see Figure 2) on generation fuels in Great Britain (but not Northern Ireland).
This paper studies the impact of asymmetries in carbon taxes between connected countries on
cross-border electricity trade. It takes Great Britain (GB) as a case study and demonstrates how
the unilateral imposition of a carbon tax affects electricity prices, interconnector flows, congestion
income (from the difference in price across congested interconnectors), and deadweight loss. We
estimate that over 2015-2018, when the CPS stabilised at £18/t CO2, the CPS would have raised the
GB day-ahead price by an average of about e10/MWh in the absence of compensating adjustments
through increased imports. The actual price differential with our neighbours fell to about e8/MWh
after allowing for replacement by cheaper imports. The CPS increased GB imports by 13 TWh/yr,
thereby reducing carbon tax revenue by e103 m/yr. The commercial value of interconnectors,
measured by congestion income increased by e133 m/yr, half of which was transferred to foreign
interconnector owners. The commercial value understates social value by ignoring infra-marginal
surplus valued at around e25 m/yr, but the CPS created deadweight losses of e28 m/yr. About
18% of the increase in the GB price caused by the CPS was passed through to higher French prices
and 29% in higher Dutch prices.
This paper therefore quantifies the costs and benefits of interconnector trading in the presence
of an asymmetric carbon tax that distorts trade. This has implications for the design and ideally
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harmonisation of EU carbon taxes to improve the efficiency of electricity trading.
1.1 Literature review
The value of interconnectors and the benefit of market coupling have been widely studied (e.g.
National Grid, 2014; Newbery et al., 2016; Policy Exchange, 2016; Redpoint, 2013; Po¨yry, 2016).
Newbery et al. (2019a) examine the efficiency and value of trading of GB interconnectors over
different timescales. They find that market coupling made trading with France, the Netherlands,
and the Single Electricity Market (SEM) of the island of Ireland more efficient and discuss the
importance of harmonising carbon taxes across the EU. Other studies (e.g. Gugler et al., 2018;
Keppler et al., 2016) focus on the integration of electricity prices across European electricity mar-
kets. They find that the increasing penetration of renewable energy counters the trend of increasing
price convergence, but building more interconnectors would improve price convergence.
Previous studies concerning carbon taxes have so far focused on their impact on wholesale
prices (e.g. Wild et al., 2015; Castagneto Gissey, 2014; Freitas & Da Silva, 2013; Jouvet & Solier,
2013; Kirat & Ahamada, 2011; Fell, 2010; Sijm et al., 2006), on the fuel mix and greenhouse gas
emissions (e.g. Di Cosmo & Hyland, 2013; Chyong et al., 2019; Staffell, 2017), and on investment
decisions within the power sector (e.g. Richstein et al., 2014; Green, 2018; Fan et al., 2010).
To the best of our knowledge, there is no ex-post econometric estimation of the effect of a
carbon tax on cross-border electricity trading after market coupling, nor of the deadweight loss
involved when applying carbon taxes asymmetrically across two electricity markets.
2 Market coupling
Starting from 4 February 2014, electricity market coupling in North Western Europe went live.
Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands took part in this initiative, while on the island of Ire-
land the SEM was not integrated until 1 October 2018. For that reason we limit our attention to
trade with our Continental neighbours, France and the Netherlands. Following market coupling,
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bids to buy and offers to sell are fed into a European-wide auction, which operates using EU-
PHEMIA (EU Pan-European Hybrid Electricity Market Integration Algorithm). Each market op-
erator solves for its own area price at which the area’s supply and demand equate. When different
market prices across the interconnector occur, EUPHEMIA yields a “price-independent purchase”
in the low-priced area and a “price-independent sale” in the high-priced area, corresponding to the
interconnector’s Net Transfer Capacity (NTC). As a result, prices in the higher-priced market de-
crease, and prices in the lower-priced market increase. If the prices do not converge, then the entire
NTC is allocated and prices remain different in the two zones, but if the prices can be equilibrated
with a smaller flow than the NTC, that flow is allocated to create a single price zone across the
interconnector, integrating the connected markets.
2.1 Electricity trading between connected markets
Electricity is traded forward domestically on power exchanges and over-the-counter (OTC). The
standard forward contract where there is a liquid spot market is the Contract-for-Difference (CfD),
which specifies a quantity, M, and a strike price, s. The seller sells in the spot market at price p
and receives s− p from the buyer (a possibly negative amount, in which case p− s is paid for the
M units). The seller thus earns (and the buyer pays) s×M.
Interconnector capacities are similarly sold forward in auctions for Transmission Rights held at
various timescales ranging from year-ahead, to season-ahead, month-ahead and day-ahead. Once
markets are coupled, the day-ahead market (DAM) becomes an implicit auction for all participating
countries. The price realised in this implicit auction is then used to clear all forward contracts,
with physical contracts reverting to financial rights. In addition, adjustments after the closure of
the DAM are cleared in the intraday markets.1
If the markets are not coupled, the holder of the Physical Transmission Right (PTR) for the
1Article 51 of Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1719 establishing a guideline on Forward Capacity Allocation
sets out the harmonised allocation rules for long-term transmission rights, which may be either physical or financial.
A more detailed example on interconnector trading can be found at https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/
98321/proofofflowundermarketcoupling-europeeconomicreport-pdf.
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right to import into GB will look at the day-ahead spot prices in France and GB, and exercise the
option to import if the French price is below the GB price, and will abstain from nominating flows
otherwise. If the importer has already bought French electricity ahead of time at a favourable
price and has sold forward in GB at a price exceeding the PTR price, the importer may choose
to import even if the spot price difference is unfavourable. In this case, one would observe a
Flow Against Price Difference (FAPD). Given the risks involved in trading in three markets (two
power exchanges and one interconnector auction) at different times, risk-averse traders may not
purchase the full capacity on the interconnector auction unless its price is sufficiently below the
forward price differences. Similarly, the risks of buying ahead on power exchanges before the
interconnector auction clears may inhibit trade up to the interconnector’s full capacity. In both
cases, interconnectors will be inefficiently under-used or will flow in a wrong economic direction.
(a) Pre-coupling, 2013 (b) Post-coupling, 2017
Figure 1: Day-ahead scheduled commercial exchange of IFA flows v.s. GB-FR price differentials,
before and after market coupling
Source: Day-ahead scheduled commercial exchange from RTE; day-ahead GB prices from Nord Pool;
day-ahead French prices from EPEX Spot.
Figure 1 plots the day-ahead scheduled commercial exchange (SCE) of net imports (exports
shown negative) over the Interconnexion France Angleterre (IFA) between GB and France, before
and after market coupling. There are four cables of 500 MW each for a total of 2 GW, hence the
horizontal bands of observations at multiples of 500 MW are due to one or more cables under
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maintenance or because of network limitations. In 2013, before market coupling (Figure 1a), ca-
pacity was inefficiently used with many FAPDs, while after market coupling (Figure 1b) available
capacity was efficiently used with no FAPDs.
The day-ahead scheduled commercial exchange that allocates capacity to the DAM can differ
from the final recorded cross-border physical flows because market players can buy and sell intra-
day capacity as they receive updates on renewable generation, demand changes and plant outages.
The System Operators may also intervene to balance one or both systems, although balancing mar-
kets are mostly not yet fully coupled through cross-border markets.2,3 The actual flow will be the
sum of the day-ahead, intraday and balancing flows, and any difference between the day-ahead and
actual flow should corresponds to intraday nominations. Intraday flows may be hedged by buying
and selling in the intraday market, or settled in the balancing market. In this paper, we focus on
the day-ahead market and on the GB interconnectors that have been coupled since 2014 (i.e. IFA
and BritNed).
3 The British Carbon Price Floor
The British Carbon Price Floor (CPF) was announced in the 2011 Budget and came into effect in
April 2013. It was intended to make up for the failure at that time of the EU Emissions Trading
System (ETS) to give adequate, credible and sufficiently durable carbon price signals. The CPF
was implemented by publishing a GB4 Carbon Price Support (CPS) that is added to the EU CO2
Allowance (EUA) price to increase it to the projected CPF. The CPS grew from £4.94/tCO2 in
2013 to £18/tCO2 in 2015 (and has been frozen at £18/tCO2 since then). The total GB carbon
cost rose from £5/tCO2 in early 2013 to nearly £40/tCO2 by the end of 2018. Figure 2 shows the
evolution of the (nominal) GB and the EU carbon costs in £/tCO2. The two curves start diverging
2The SEM and GB do operate a joint balancing market.
3A project named Trans European Replacement Reserves Exchange (TERRE) was approved by ENTSO-E as an
Implementation Project in 2016. The project aims to fulfil a European legal requirement imposed by the European
Electricity Balancing Guideline. The project is expected to go live in the fourth quarter of 2019.
4Northern Ireland, which is part of the Single Electricity Market of the island of Ireland, is exempt to preserve an
equal carbon price there.
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in 2013, with the gap becoming wider in 2014 and 2015. The dashed line represents the GB carbon
cost target when the CPF was announced. It was not until late 2018 that the GB carbon cost finally
met the initial trajectory, thanks to the reform of the EU ETS, which introduced a Market Stability
Reserve that removes excess EUAs and increases the European Emission Allowance (EUA) price
(Newbery et al., 2019b).
Figure 2: Evolution of the European Allowance (EUA) price and CPF, £/tCO2
Source: Chyong, Guo and Newbery (2019).
The CPS raises the cost of fossil-fuelled electricity generation. Figure 3 plots the 28-day mov-
ing average (MA) of the day-ahead prices for GB, France (FR), and the Netherlands (NL), as well
as the price differentials between the two connected markets. It also shows the variable cost (i.e.
the short-run marginal cost) for Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGTs) with 54.5%5 efficiency
with EUA prices included (but excluding the GB CPS) as a measure of Continental gas generation
costs.
In general, while GB prices are typically higher than NL prices, the CPS widens the GB-NL
price differential. FR prices are much more volatile than that in GB and NL mainly because nearly
5Measured at Lower Heating Value (LHV).
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Figure 3: 28-day lagged Moving Average wholesale prices, 2013-2017
80% (in 2015)6 of its gross electricity generation comes from nuclear power stations, making its
electricity system less flexible than in GB and NL, resulting in more volatile prices. Another reason
for the high volatility is that French prices are very weather-sensitive given their high domestic
electrical heating load. During December 2016 and January 2017, France experienced nuclear
outages,7 which explains the negative GB−FR price differential during that period. The variable
cost for CCGTs partially explains the patterns of prices for the three markets, and best fits the
dynamics of the Dutch prices, where gas is likely to be the marginal fuel much of the time.
The higher GB carbon price (equivalently, the lack of an EU-wide CPS) distorts trade and
could harm price convergence from market integration between the GB and Continental electricity
wholesale markets.
3.1 The impact of a carbon tax
Generators offering into the DAM will likely mark-up their offers above the short-run marginal
cost to recover start-up and fixed costs (and possibly further if exercising market power). Adding
6From Eurostat at: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/get-latest-energy-data-all-eu-countries.
7See https://www.ft.com/content/f86a3c6c-9c60-11e6-a6e4-8b8e77dd083a.
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the CPS increases short-run marginal costs but generators may absorb some of the tax by marking
up their offers by a smaller amount if the market is imperfectly competitive, depending on the
shape of the residual demand curve. In the absence of any cross-border trading, the cost pass-
through of the CPS would then be less than 100%. Under mark-up pricing (Newbery and Greve,
2017), however, any cost shock would also be marked up and the cost pass-through would be more
than 100%.
Chyong et al. (2019) estimated the increase in marginal costs by finding the system marginal
CO2 emissions factor in each hour and multiplying it by the CPS, effectively assuming a 100%
pass-through of the CPS. Our paper uses econometric methods to measure the increase in the GB
wholesale price resulting from the CPS holding interconnector flows constant. This allows us to
measure the domestic cost pass-through as a percentage of the system marginal cost increase. If the
cost pass-through rate is less than 100% and domestic demand is insensitive to wholesale prices,
the domestic impact of the CPS will be to reduce the deadweight loss of imperfect competition.
Interconnectors complicate this simple single market story. The increase in GB offer prices
into the DAM will change the market clearing price and hence the congestion income (the product
of DAM price differences and flows). If the CPS does not change flows (because before and
after the CPS the interconnector capacity remains fully used in the same direction) there will
be no additional distortion but there will be a transfer of revenue to the foreign owners of the
interconnectors (both IFA and BritNed are shared 50:50 with the foreign TSOs). If flows are
changed then there will be an additional deadweight loss. If demand is inelastic, the deadweight
loss will be the difference in the total cost of generation with and without the CPS.
Figure 4 shows the result of imposing the CPS on GB generators when the import capacity
over IFA from France (FR) is KL. If there were no interconnector, the GB price would be PGB0
where the GB net supply SGB0 meets demand D0 at I. With the interconnector, the GB net supply
curve meets the FR net supply curve at point H, with prices equalised (PGB1 =P
FR
1 ), no congestion
income and imports ML. Under the assumption of zero consumer demand elasticity (i.e. vertical
demand curves), the gain in surplus created by the interconnector is entirely due to a reduction
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in GB generation costs, offset by a small increase in FR cost, with the net cost reduction shown
as the triangle labelled “original market surplus”, or HIJ. The triangle HIJ is also known as the
infra-marginal surplus without CPS.
After the introduction of the CPS, the GB supply curve shifts upward to SGBc and the intercon-
nector is now fully utilised with imports KL. The GB DAM (or consumer post-tax) price is PGBC
but the producer price (before tax) is PPGBC . The FR price rises to P
FR
C and the congestion income
equals KL × (PGBC −PFRC ), or the rectangle ABCE, and the area ABN+CEJ are the infra-marginal sur-
plus with CPS. However, while GB generation costs have fallen, FR cost has risen and the total
increase in cost is the triangle HEG, which corresponds to a deadweight loss.
 
GB Demand FR Demand 
PGB1 
PFR1 
PGBc 
PFRc 
SGBC 
SGB0 
SFR0 
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GB Price FR Price 
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Figure 4: Impact of CPS on Imports and Surpluses, GB Imports from Partial to Full Capacity
The deadweight loss can be estimated if we can measure the GB−FR price differential with
the carbon tax (or AE in Figure 4) and the impact of the CPS on GB prices (or AG in Figure 4).
Under the assumption of (locally)linear net supply curves, given the increase in import is KM, the
deadweight loss is 1/2×(AG-AE)×KM. The base of the triangle, AG-AE or EG is the sum of the
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reduction of the GB producer price (PGB1 −PPGBC ) and the increase in the FR price due to its increase
in exports (PFRC −PFR1 ). We name this the CPS pass-through to the interconnector, and its ratio to
the impact of the CPS on GB prices, or EG/AG, the cross-border CPS pass-through rate.
The typical way to estimate deadweight loss is the distortion (e.g. the tax wedge AG) times
the change in output (KM), assuming consumption and production are equal (the standard closed-
economy model). However, in this case GB consumption and production are not equal. Con-
sumption remains unchanged at D0 (because of its assumed inelasticity) while GB production falls
by KM and FR production increases by the same amount, giving the total deadweight loss as the
triangle HEG.
The carbon tax also leads to an increase in congestion income but half of this goes to the
French TSO, the half-owner of IFA. French prices rise from PFR1 to P
FR
C , increasing FR generator
profits by less that the increase in consumer costs (the difference being the French share of the total
deadweight loss).
Similar diagrams can be drawn for other cases (GB initially exporting, the direction of trade
flows changed but not reversed, etc.), but the cost-benefit principles remain the same. Details
of other cases can be found in Appendix A.3. If we ignore differences between offer prices and
marginal costs and assume inelastic final consumer demand, then the benefits of the interconnectors
are the total reduction in generation costs, which correspond to the fall in the importer’s (higher)
cost less the increase in the exporter’s (lower) cost. The CPS changes this and reduces this gain
as it substitutes some higher actual cost imported generation for some lower actual but higher tax-
plus GB generation cost. This is with the proviso that all costs should be measured with the correct
carbon prices, and we have assumed that the no-CPS equilibrium trade is the same as the correctly
carbon-charged trade.
3.2 Estimating the impact of the CPS
Figure 5 plots the Price Differential Duration Schedules (PDDS) of IFA (GB minus FR, or PDIFA)
before (2013) and after (2017) market coupling. The difference between the two curves is that
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after market coupling, the price differentials cluster around the horizontal line at zero (Figure 5b).
The reason is that there are many hours for which there is sufficient capacity to equalise GB and
French prices, while it is unusual for prices to be the same for the uncoupled 2013 PDDS (Figure
5a). The line at PDIFA = 0 is not perfectly horizontal because the prices are equated based on Mid
Channel nominations and then adjusted at each end by a loss factor to give prices in each country.
(a) Pre-coupling, 2013 (b) Post-coupling, 2017
Figure 5: Price Differential Duration Schedules for IFA Price Differential (GB-FR) , 2013 v.s.
2017
Source: Day-ahead GB prices from Nord Pool; day-ahead French prices from Blomberg EPEX Spot.
Without the British CPS (while keeping the interconnector flow constant) the entire PDDS
curve for 2017 (Figure 5b) would shift downwards, as illustrated in Figure 6.8 If the market is then
coupled, GB would keep exporting with full capacity at a price difference AB and keep importing
with full capacity at price difference CD. The outcome is more complex at price difference BC,
where with CPS, GB was either importing or exporting at less-than-full capacity. At BC, if the
maximum 4 GW switch (from 2 GW to −2 GW) of the interconnector flow is sufficient to inte-
grate the prices, the price differential for that hour would cluster at zero. If instead the 4 GW is
insufficient to equalise the prices, GB would be exporting at full capacity and the price differential
would fall to a negative value. For instance, suppose that the impact of flows on the price differ-
8To make the difference clearer, the plot assumes the CPS lowers price differentials by e30/MWh, much higher
than its actual impact.
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ence, PDIFA, is e2/MWh/GW and that with the CPS applying, for a particular hour GB imports
0.5 GW and the GB and French markets are integrated. Now, if removing the CPS would cause the
GB price to fall by e7/MWh, GB would be exporting at full capacity (2 GW) in that hour. The
resulting 2.5 GW shift in the interconnector flow would, as a result of price changes, lead to PDIFA
falling back to e−2/MWh (=−7+2.5×2).
Figure 6: The Price Differential Duration Schedules with and without the CPS
The example in Figure 6 warns us against determining the impact of the CPS on interconnector
flows without considering the impact of flows on the price differential. In this research, we estimate
the impact of interconnector flows and the CPS on the IFA and BritNed price differentials, thereby
obtaining the proportion of CPS that has been passed through to the GB day-ahead price. Using
the regression results, we implement the following three-stage process. First, we estimate PDDS’s
without the CPS holding flows at their original value. Second, we re-couple the interconnector
markets, with any changes in flows further influencing the price differentials. Third, using the
estimated price differentials and flows without the CPS but under market coupling, we evaluate the
impact of the CPS on net imports, congestion income, the carbon cost pass-through to the cross-
border market, and deadweight loss.9 We estimate the impacts on both interconnectors (IFA and
9Chyong et al. (2019) used the three-stage processes but in a different order: they first estimate the duration
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BritNed) to estimate the improvement in efficiency from aligning carbon pricing policy.
The first challenge is that the day-ahead market is an implicit auction, which means both DAM
prices and flows are determined simultaneously, resulting in simultaneous equation issues. Finding
proper instrumental variables for the day-ahead flows is difficult because under market coupling,
the day-ahead flows are only determined by the price differentials between day-ahead prices, the
dependent variables. We address this by using the day-ahead forecast of net transfer capacity
(NTC) as regression covariates instead of the day-ahead flow. NTC is only influenced by outages,
maintenance or network limitations and so can be treated as exogenous. The estimated impact of
NTC on the price difference allows us to estimate how flows would affect price differentials. For
example, suppose 1 GW of IFA capacity lowers the price differential, PDIFA, by e1/MWh, and the
average IFA flow is 1.2 GW. If the average capacity for IFA is 1.5 GW (i.e. GB net imports are on
average 80% of average NTC), then a 1 GW change in the flow would result in a e1/MWh/(80%)
= e1.25/MWh change in PDIFA.
The second challenge is that the econometric model only allows us to estimate the partial
effects of the CPS on price differentials conditional on the NTC and the partial effects of the
NTC on price differentials conditional on the CPS. Therefore using regression results to estimate
the price differential after re-coupling the cross-border market (i.e. the second-stage of the three-
stage process) could give invalid estimates. We deal with this by assuming that the impacts of
interconnector flows on price differentials are independent of the CPS. In other words, we assume
that with the CPS, a 1 GW flow would have an identical impact on the price differential as it would
on the price differential without the CPS.10
schedule curve without the interconnector and then estimate the impact of the CPS on the price differential. This is
justified under the assumption of a 100% CO2 pass-though, which is not conditional on the IFA transfer capacity.
10This assumption can be challenged by the argument that the CPS might change the merit order of fossil plants,
therefore the impact of NTC/flows on price differentials can be different with and without the CPS. To test whether
this is true, we implement Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests and the results suggest that the CPS has no significant impact
on the impact of NTC on price differentials.
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4 Econometric Models
In this section, we study the impact of interconnector flows and the British CPS on the day-ahead
price differentials between the connected markets.11 As electricity supply has to meet demand at
every second, prices are highly volatile, and so are price differentials. To deal with this, we imple-
ment the Multivariate Generalised Auto-Regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (M-GARCH)
model (Silvennoinen & Tera¨svirta, 2008), which accounts for variations in both the mean and
volatility of electricity price differentials. The model has been widely used to model day-ahead
electricity prices (e.g. Kirat & Ahamada, 2011; Anna-Phan & Roques, 2018).
Hourly prices for the next day are all set simultaneously in the day-ahead auction. Therefore,
within a day the price for any hour does not carry much information about the next hour (Keppler,
2014; Wu¨rzburg et al., 2013; Sensfuss et al., 2008), hence neither does the day-ahead price dif-
ferential. As a result, instead of treating the price differentials as an hourly univariate time series,
we treat them as daily multivariate time series. In order to substantially reduce the number of
parameters to be estimated, we assume that during peak hours (06:00-22:00 UTC) the electricity
system exhibits similar scheduling behaviour and similarly during off-peak (22:00-06:00 UTC)
hours.12 For each interconnector, there are two time series (peak and off-peak) describing the price
differentials. The models we estimate are bivariate GARCH models whose mean equation is,
yt = µ +
m
∑
i=1
Φiyt−i+ΓX t +ε t , (1)
11An alternative is to study those impacts for each country separately, but that may raise the following issues: first,
we use the estimation results to estimate the impact of the CPS on cross-border trading, which is only determined by
price differentials between the two connected markets. Estimating the effects on each country and then combining
the results is less efficient than directly estimating the impact on price differentials. Second, it ignores the price
co-movements between the connected countries caused by variables that are not included in the regression (such as
temperature). Third, due to the limited variation in the CPS and its modest impact abroad, directly estimating the
impact of the CPS on France and the Netherlands would deliver results that are not statistically significant.
12Peak and off-peak hours are referenced from https://customerservices.npower.com/app/answers/detail/a id/179/
∼/what-are-the-economy-7-peak-and-off-peak-periods%3F. Figure A.1 in the Appendix presents the standardised
average daily load curves for the three markets during the years of studying, and the two dashed vertical lines represent
borders between peak and off-peak. The estimation results change little when the time band slightly varies.
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where
yt =PD ICt =
PDIC,PEAKt
PDIC,OFFt

where IC∈ {IFA,BN} refers to the interconnector, IFA or BritNed, and
PDIC,it = P
GB,i
t −POC,it
for the other country, OC∈ {FR,NL}, France or the Netherlands. PDt represents DAM price differ-
entials, i ∈ {PEAK,OFF}, t represents days, and Pt’s are day-ahead prices. X t is a k× 1 vector of
deterministic variables consisting of two types: period-specific covariates and shared covariates.
Within the day, period-specific covariates have different values in peak and off-peak periods,
include day-ahead forecasts of renewable generation, day-ahead forecasts of net generation (net of
imports and renewables) and day-ahead forecasts of the net transfer capacity (NTC) of IFA and
BritNed. We control for nuclear generation as it can influence the day-ahead price, especially for
France (see Figure 3 for the impact of French nuclear outages). All period-specific covariates can
be regarded as exogenous. Renewable generation depends on weather. Once the NTC has been
controlled for, net demand is exogenous as it is inelastic in the short-run (Clo` et al., 2015), while
day-ahead NTC depends on whether or not there are outages and is unaffected by prices. Nuclear
generation runs unless there is an outage, although French nuclear power may reduce output off-
peak, separating each day into peak and off-peak periods controls that endogeneity.
As GB has consistently been a net importer via IFA and BritNed, we expect the day-ahead
NTC to lower the price differential. Similarly, we expect increases in GB supply (e.g. renewable
and nuclear generation) and reductions in GB demand to reduce the GB price and hence the price
differential, and conversely for France and the Netherlands.
The shared covariates have the same values for different periods of the same day, which in-
cludes variable costs for coal and gas plants (excluding carbon costs), the EUA price, the British
CPS in Euro (using the daily exchange rate), and dummies for each season. Although some stud-
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ies have found that dynamic interactions among fuel, carbon, and electricity prices may play an
important role in price formation (Knittel and Roberts, 2005), we argue that fuel and carbon costs
are more likely to be affected by the EU wholesale prices than by a single or pair of countries. The
impact of fuels costs on the price differential would depend on the (marginal) fuel mixes in the two
connected markets. Studies of IFA have shown that during 2013-2017, fossil fuel provided more
than 80% of GB’s marginal generation (Chyong et al., 2019; Staffell, 2017), while the marginal
generation in France has heavily relied on hydro and imports, setting the price 89% of the time
(Castagneto Gissey et al., 2018).
We might expect fuel costs and EUA prices to have a stronger impact on the GB DAM price
than the French DAM price, while recognising that marginal imports of France come from in
other fossil-fuel intensive Continental markets (e.g. Germany, Italy, and Spain). These could
significantly affect the French price, making the impact of fuel costs and EUA on the GB−FR price
differential ambiguous. Similarly, while we expect the GB−NL price differential to be negatively
correlated with the coal price and positively correlated with the gas price because the Netherlands
is more coal-intensive than GB,13 as NL is closely integrated with other Continental European
countries, these impacts can also be ambiguous.
Finally, as other EU countries have not yet followed the British CPF, we would expect the
CPS to have a positive impact on price differentials for both interconnectors in both periods. The
estimates for the impact of the CPS on the price differential are conditional on the NTC and
hence holding constant interconnector flows that can affect market prices in our neighbours. The
coefficients for the CPS thus estimate the undiluted (by trade) impact of the CPS on the GB DAM
price. That implies that the estimated impact of the CPS on the price differentials for IFA and
BritNed should be statistically insignificantly different. We can then use the result to test whether
the CPS has a 100% pass-through rate in relation to the GB DAM price.
In equation (1), Φ1, ...,Φm are 2× 2 matrices of parameters capturing the spill-over effects
across and within markets at period t − i, where i = 1, ...,m, and Γ is an 2× k matrix with each
13The latest data from Eurostat shows that the fuel mix generation in the Netherlands (UK in brackets) was 35%
(22%) coal and 45% (30%) gas.
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element capturing the instantaneous impact of the corresponding covariates on the dependent vari-
ables. µ and ε t are 2×1 vectors representing the constant terms and the error terms.
The auto-regressive (AR) terms capture lagged responses to changes in market conditions. The
instantaneous (or short-run, SR) impacts are captured by Γ, while the long-run (LR) cumulative
effects is (i′−∑mi=1Φi)−1Γ, where i is a 2×1 column vector of ones. The long-run effect measures
the eventual change in y following a permanent change in X . We would expect the LR effect to be
greater than the SR effect as it takes time for the market to adjust to LR policy changes (such as
the CPF).
In order to control for heteroskedasticity and estimate the impact of the corresponding covari-
ates on the volatility of price differentials, we assume ε t to be conditionally heteroskedastic:
ε t =H
1/2
t η t (2)
given the information set It−1, where the 2× 2 matrix H t = [σ2i j,t ],∀i, j = 1,2, is the conditional
covariance matrix of ε t . η t is a normal, independent, and identical innovation vector with zero
means and a covariance matrix equalling to the identity matrix, i.e. Eη tη ′t = I .
We use the Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC)14 GARCH(1,1) model proposed by Boller-
slev (1990), where the conditional correlation matrix, H t , can be expressed as:
H t =D
1/2
t RD
1/2
t , (3)
where R = [ρi j] is a 2×2 time-invariant covariance matrix of the standardised residuals D−1/2t ε t .
R is positive definite with diagonal terms ρii = 1. Dt = [di j,t ] is a diagonal matrix consisting of
conditional variances with dii,t = σ2ii,t , and di j,t = 0 for i 6= j.
The model assumes the conditional variances for the price differentials follow univariate GAR-
CH(1,1) models and the covariance between price differentials is given by a constant-correlation
14The LM tests reject the null of varying conditional correlations.
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coefficient multiplying the conditional standard deviation of the price differentials:
σ2ii,t = exp(γ izi,t)+αε
2
i,t−1+βσ
2
ii,t−1, (4)
σ2i j,t = ρi j
√
σ2ii,tσ2j j,t , (5)
where zi,t is a k′×1 vector of deterministic variables.15 In our case, zi,t contains a constant term as
well as all deterministic variables in X t in the mean equation (1). As domestic wind might increase
the volatility of both domestic and cross-border DAM prices (Annan-Phan and Roques, 2018), its
impact on the volatility of the price differential is unclear as wind is correlated across neighbouring
countries. We would also expect the day-ahead NTC to lower price volatility as interconnectors
facilitate convergence between the connected markets. Fuel prices have an ambiguous impact on
the volatility of price differentials as it depends on the fuel mix, merit order and demand between
the connected markets. Lastly, we expect the CPS to raise GB day-ahead price volatility as it
pushes the less flexible coal generation from baseload to mid-merit (Chyong et al., 2019), thereby
raising the volatility of the GB−FR (or GB−NL) price differentials.
In equation (4), γ i is a 1×k′ vector of parameters capturing the instantaneous impacts of deter-
ministic variables on the conditional variance, σ2ii,t , of yi,t . In addition, α is the ARCH parameter
capturing short-run persistence and β is the GARCH parameters capturing long-run persistence.
One advantage for the M-GARCH model is that it allows for the existence of missing data, where
the missing dynamic components are substituted by the unconditional expectations. The model
is estimated by Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). The number of lags m of the dependent
variables will be determined by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Infor-
mation Criterion (BIC).
15Using exponential transformations to guarantee positive volatility.
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4.1 Data
Day-ahead market (DAM) price data are collected from the ENTSO-E Transparency Platform,
except for GB, which is collected from the Nord Pool Market Data Platform.16 ENTSO-E also
provides the day-ahead forecast of scheduled net generation (net of imports and renewables), re-
newable generation (wind and solar), and net transfer capacities (NTC). For nuclear generation,
due to data availability we use the ex-post real data as proxies for the day-head forecast. As nu-
clear is highly inflexible, we would expect the forecast on nuclear generation to be reasonably
close to actual generation.
The daily coal and gas prices as well as the EUA price are collected from the InterContinental
Exchange (theice.com). The appropriate prices are the daily prices one day ahead when offers are
submitted. In order to calculate the delivered coal and gas costs into power stations, quarterly aver-
ages of the daily prices are subtracted from the BEIS quarterly “average prices of fuels purchased
by the major UK power producers”.17 The daily data are then adjusted by adding this margin. All
sterling prices are converted to Euros using daily exchange rates. We assume the thermal efficiency
for coal-fired power plants to be 35.6% and 54.5% for CCGTs (Chyong et al., 2019). This gives
the variable fossil costs for coal and gas plants in e/MWhe without accounting for the carbon cost.
The CPS increased from £9.55/tCO2 to £18/tCO2 on 1 April 2015. The lack of variation can
potentially result in large standard errors for the estimated coefficients. We deal with this by
converting the CPS from GBP to Euro, using the daily exchange rate, which is assumed a good
forecast for tomorrow’s rate. This also allows us to capture the impact of policy shocks such as the
Brexit referendum on cross-border electricity trading.
Table 1 gives summary statistics for all variables. Descriptive statistics of the DAM prices can
be found in Appendix A.2. Outliers for price differentials are defined as values exceeding four
standard deviations of the sample mean, and are removed and treated as missing data.
16ENTSO-E does provide the GB DAM price in sterling but Nord Pool conveniently uses the daily exchange rate to
convert it from sterling to Euros.
17https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/790152/
table 321.xlsx
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, Day-ahead Markets
Variable Unit Abbr. Mean S. D. Min. Max.
IFA Peak diff. e/MWh PDIFA,PEAK 13.55 14.82 -70.63 240.05
IFA Off-peak diff. e/MWh PDIFA,OFF 11.18 10.21 -38.48 48.36
BritNed Peak diff. e/MWh PDBN,PEAK 15.24 10.90 -36.41 245.52
BritNed Off-peak diff. e/MWh PDBN,OFF 12.51 5.38 -6.83 33.36
Peak GB renew. GW RGB,PEAK 6.63 2.86 0.95 15.47
Off-peak GB renew. GW RGB,OFF 4.85 2.83 0.37 13.87
Peak FR renew. GW RFR,PEAK 3.90 1.62 0.90 11.99
Off-peak FR renew. GW RFR,OFF 2.54 1.52 0.54 10.90
Peak NL renew. GW RNL,PEAK 1.35 0.84 0.09 5.42
Off-peak NL renew. GW RNL,OFF 1.03 0.75 0.04 4.19
Peak GB net gen. GW GGB,PEAK 38.60 5.62 25.44 54.10
Off-peak GB net gen. GW GGB,OFF 27.26 4.42 17.63 38.84
Peak FR net gen. GW GFR,PEAK 64.11 10.01 42.99 89.61
Off-peak FR net gen. GW GFR,OFF 57.20 9.27 37.84 81.91
Peak NL net gen. GW GNL,PEAK 15.56 3.11 7.45 25.87
Off-peak NL net gen. GW GNL,OFF 14.03 2.10 8.44 21.46
Peak GB nuclear GW NGB,PEAK 7.37 0.69 4.31 8.99
Off-peak GB nuclear GW NGB,OFF 7.38 0.68 5.18 8.98
Peak FR nuclear GW NFR,PEAK 45.04 6.56 30.03 61.27
Off-peak FR nuclear GW NFR,OFF 44.07 6.46 29.89 60.54
Peak NL nuclear GW NNL,PEAK 0.45 0.20 0 0.55
Off-peak NL nuclear GW NNL,OFF 0.45 0.20 0 0.55
IFA peak cap. GW NTCIFA,PEAK 1.77 0.38 0.33 2.00
IFA off-peak cap. GW NTCIFA,OFF 1.78 0.37 0.50 2.00
BritNed peak cap. GW NTCBN,PEAK 1.00 0.13 0.00 1.06
BritNed off-peak cap. GW NTCBN,OFF 1.01 0.10 0.00 1.04
Coal plant var. cost e/MWhe VCCOAL 29.03 5.92 17.02 43.07
Gas plant var. cost e/MWhe VCCCGT 35.32 6.90 20.52 55.15
EUA price e/tCO2 EUA 8.835 4.85 3.99 25.25
CPS e/tCO2 CPS 21.32 2.82 12.17 25.95
Table 2 shows the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Ljung-Box test results. The ADF tests
for the existence of a unit root (I(1) process) and the test statistics suggest that all price differentials
have no unit root. The ADF test for DAM prices are provided in Appendix A.2, which also sug-
gests no unit root for all prices, in agreement with other research (Annan-Phan and Roque, 2018;
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Table 2: ADF and Ljung-Box Tests on Price Differentails (in e/MWh), Lags=7
Variable Abbr. ADF test Ljung-Box test
Statistic P-value Statistic P-value
IFA Peak diff. PDIFA,PEAK -6.107 0.000 164 0.000
IFA Off-peak diff. PDIFA,OFF -5.249 0.000 1760 0.000
BritNed Peak diff. PDBN,PEAK -9.283 0.000 167 0.000
BritNed Off-peak diff. PDBN,OFF -6.608 0.000 45 0.000
Tashpulatov, 2013).18 The Ljung-Box test uses the square of the demeaned dependent variables
to test for the existence of heteroskedasticity (Harvey, 1993). The test results reject the null of
homoskedastic variance, and ensures the validity of controlling for heteroskedasticity.
5 Results
Both AIC and BIC suggest the order of the autoregressive process m in the conditional mean
equation (1) to be 7 for both interconnectors, equivalent to a weekly cycle, and helps to control for
weekly periodicity. Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests determine whether the more complicated Dynamic
Conditional Correlation (DCC) model instead of the proposed Constant Conditional Correlation
(CCC) model is needed (Tse & Tsui, 2002). The test statistics for both regressions suggest using
the CCC model. Estimates of the correlation coefficients, ρi j in equation (3) are within the interval
of (−1,1), and estimates of the conditional variance matrices, H t ,∀t are positive definite, ensuring
the validity of the M-GARCH model.
The next few subsections present the estimation results for key parameters for both IFA and
BritNed. Section 5.1 presents the SR effect of deterministic variables on price differentials; sec-
tion 5.2 gives the estimated LR effects; section 5.3 presents the impact on the volatility of price
differentials; section 5.4 calculates, interprets and discusses the CPS pass-through to the GB DAM
price. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 estimate the counterfactuals on both interconnectors without the CPS.
18There is also research showing the existence of a unit root on the DAM price, such as Freitas and da Silva (2013)
and Fell (2010).
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5.1 The short-run effects
Table 3 presents the main estimation results19 for the mean equation (1), which gives the instanta-
neous (SR) impacts of deterministic variables on the price differentials. As expected, because re-
newable generation lowers electricity prices, GB renewable generation (RGB) reduces the normally
higher GB price and hence reduces the price differential. French and Dutch renewable generation
(RFR and RNL) increase the price differential. The coefficients on renewable generation are all sta-
tistically significant. RFR and RNL have a higher impact on the price differential (in magnitude)
than RGB. The reason might be that gas sets the price over 50% of the time in GB (Castagneto
Gissey et al., 2018; Chyong et al., 2019), much more than its neighbours. This means that GB has
a more flexible electricity system,20 so GB prices are less affected by the variability of renewable
generation. On average, 1 GW in GB wind generation instantly reduces the GB−FR (GB−NL)
price differential PDIFA,i by e0.31 (0.27)/MWh during off-peak and by e0.41 (0.57)/MWh during
peak periods, while 1 GW of Continental wind generation increases in PDIFA,i (PDBN,i) by e1.80
(1.86)/MWh during off-peak and by e1.86 (2.15)/MWh during peak periods.
Because GB typically imports from France and the Netherlands, additional IFA and BritNed
NTC reduces price differentials for both interconnectors but creates more arbitrage revenue, though
their effects are only statistically significant during peak hours. This is not surprising if both
markets have convex and monotonically increasing marginal cost curves, as illustrated in Appendix
Figure A.2. During off-peak periods, electricity systems are running at base load with a relatively
flat marginal cost curve, so a change in net demand has little impact on prices for both markets. In
general, IFA NTC has a much smaller impact on the price differential than BritNed’s NTC because
the French market is more than triple the size of the Dutch market (Table 1), so IFA capacity is a
smaller proportion of French total load compared to BritNed’s capacity share in the Netherlands.
During peak periods, a 1 GW increase in the IFA NTC on average reduces PDIFA,i on that day by
e1.26/MWh, while a 1 GW increase in the peak BritNed NTC on average reduces PDBN,i on that
19The coefficients for the rest of variables are listed in Table A.4.
20CCGTs are more flexible than coal-fired power plants.
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Table 3: Short-run Effects: M-GARCH Mean Equations
IFA Price Diff. BritNed Price Diff.
Variable Unit PDIFA,PEAK PDIFA,OFF PDBN,PEAK PDBN,OFF
RGB GW −0.41∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.57∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
RFR or RNL GW 1.86∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗ 2.15∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.12) (0.20) (0.20)
NTC GW −1.26∗∗ −0.19 −3.34∗ −0.82
(0.45) (0.36) (1.40) (1.22)
VCCOAL e/MWhe −0.35∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
VCCCGT e/MWhe 0.32∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
EUA e/tCO2 −0.14∗∗ −0.10∗ −0.24∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
CPS e/tCO2 0.23∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
No. Obs. 1412 1412 1411 1411
Standard errors in parentheses. Subscript e indicates per MWh of electricity generation
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05.
day by e3.34/MWh.
The estimates show that coal prices have a negative influence on price differentials for both
interconnectors, yet the impact is higher for IFA than BritNed and for peak compared to off-peak
periods. In contrast, gas prices have a positive effect on price differentials, with coefficients twice
as large for IFA than BritNed, but with a negligible difference between peak and off-peak. One
reason is that the CPS made coal more expensive than gas in GB, causing the share of coal to fall
drastically (Chyong et al., 2019), which was not the case for the rest of the EU (at least until the
end of 2017). As GB relies more heavily on gas than the Continent, coal prices have a greater
impact abroad and thus negatively affect the price differential, while gas prices have a positive
impact. Taking IFA as an example, a e1/MWh increase in the variable cost of coal generation is
associated with a decline in the peak price differential by e0.35/MWh; while a e1/MWh increase
in the variable cost for gas generation would raise the peak price differential by e0.32/MWh.
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The estimated negative impact of the EUA price on price differentials is also intuitive. The CPS
forces GB to become less carbon-intensive than other EU countries, hence the EUA price will have
a lower impact on GB prices relative to other EU countries. A e1/tCO2 increase in the EUA price
is associated with e0.14(0.24)/MWh instant reduction in GB−FR(NL) peak price differential and
with e0.10(0.13)/MWh reduction in GB−FR(NL) off-peak price differential.
The CPS raises the GB price and so should increase the price differential. Taking peak periods
as examples, in the short-run, a e1/tCO2 increase in the CPS increases the peak GB−FR price
differential by e0.23/MWh, or increases the GB−NL price differential by e0.24/MWh. These
impacts on price differentials are conditional on holding interconnector flows and Continental
prices constant, and so can be regarded as two (insignificantly different) estimates of the SR impact
the CPS on the GB DAM price, holding trade flows constant.
5.2 The long-run effect
Major policy changes such as the British CPF and the EU Market Stability Reserve can perma-
nently change the carbon price, making their LR impact of greater relevance for policy analysis.
Table 4: Long-run Effects
IFA Price Diff. BritNed Price Diff.
Variable Unit PDIFA,PEAK PDIFA,OFF PDIFA,AVE PDBN,PEAK PDBN,OFF PDBN,AVE
EUA e/tCO2 −0.42∗ −0.29∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗ −0.63∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.53∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.10)
CPS e/tCO2 0.59∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05.
The estimates for the LR effects of EUA and CPS, and the corresponding standard errors are
listed in Table 4.21 As expected, the LR effects of EUA and CPS are both greater than the SR effects
for both interconnectors both peak and off-peak. On (weighted) average, a e1/tCO2 permanent
increase in the CPS corresponds to a e0.61/MWh (s.e.=0.12) permanent increase in the GB−FR
21The LR effects on other deterministic variables can be obtained from the SR results in Table 3 and A.4.
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price differential, or a e0.46/MWh (s.e.=0.08) increase in the GB−NL price differential. Recall
that conditional on NTC, these are also estimates of the permanent impact of CPS on the GB DAM
price, and their difference is not statistically significant.
On the Brexit referendum night, the GBP/EUR exchange rate fell sharply from 1.30 to 1.17,22
or equivalently, reduced the GB CPS by e2.34/tCO2. In the long run, the referendum reduced the
GB−FR(NL) price differential by e1.42 (1.08)/MWh.
5.3 The impact on volatilities
Given the variability of wind, evidence has been found that wind increases the volatility of domes-
tic prices (Wu¨rzburg et al., 2013; Jensen and Skytte, 2002, and Sensfuss et al., 2008), although the
impact of price differentials is less clear as wind across connected markets is strongly positively
correlated in our data. The results in Table 5 suggest that off-peak renewable generation in both
markets increases the volatility of price differentials while GB peak renewable generation (RGB)
reduces it. The positive effect is easy to explain because renewable generation (just wind as there
is no off-peak solar generation) is unpredictable day-ahead. The negative effect during peak pe-
riods might be because high GB prices are less likely to occur during days with high renewable
generation.23
Although statistically insignificant, both regressions suggest that NTC reduces the volatility of
the price differential, in agreement with Annan-Phan and Roques (2018). Finally, the CPS raised
the volatility of price differentials, with a statistically significant impact during peak hours, when
both coal and gas plants are operating. The CPS then amplifies price variability.
5.4 The CPS pass-through to the GB day-ahead price
The CPS increases the cost of generation and raises DAM prices. The ratio between the increase in
the DAM price and the increase in the system marginal cost (due to the CPS, holding interconnector
22See https://www.finder.com/uk/brexit-pound
23Evidence can be found from the data, where when the peak GB price exceeds the sample mean by more than two
standard deviations, GB renewable generation is only 70% of its sample mean.
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Table 5: Volatility: M-GARCH Conditional Variance Equations
IFA Price Diff. BritNed Price Diff.
Variables Unit PEAK OFF PEAK OFF
RGB GW −0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
RFR or RNL GW −0.03 0.18∗∗∗ 0.04 0.30∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09)
NTC GW −0.02 −0.13 −0.58 −0.31
(0.13) (0.15) (0.36) (0.59)
VCCOAL e/MWhe 0.06∗∗∗ −0.01 0.07∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
VCCCGT e/MWhe 0.00 0.04∗∗ −0.00 0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EUA e/tCO2 −0.03 0.02 −0.05∗∗∗ −0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
CPS e/tCO2 0.05∗∗ 0.01 0.05∗∗ 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Cond. corr. 0.48∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03)
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
flows constant) is the CPS pass-through to the GB DAM price.
Using the estimated GB marginal emission factors (MEFs) from Chyong et al. (2019) we
estimate that over 2015-2018,24 a e1/MWh increase in the CPS on average increases the system
marginal cost of electricity by e0.374/MWh (s.e.= e0.005). Assuming the estimates of this paper
and Chyong et al. (2019) are independent,25 the SR CPS pass-through rate is 60% from IFA
estimates (or 58% from BritNed estimates) with a 95% confidence interval of 35-85% (IFA) or
35-80% (BritNed).26 In the short run, our estimates suggest that the market is not very sensitive to
CPS changes due to exchange rate fluctuations.
The estimated LR CPS pass-through rate from the IFA estimate is 163% (s.e.=31%) and from
the BritNed estimate is 124% (s.e.=21%). These differences are not statistically significant from
24Chyong et al. (2019)’s period of estimation is 2012-2017 in the Appendix, here we assume the MEF for GB in
2018 is the same as that in 2017.
25These papers use different datasets.
26See http://www.stat.cmu.edu/∼hseltman/files/ratio.pdf for computing the confidence intervals.
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each other nor from 100% (i.e. complete) pass-through (at the 1% significance level). This is
consistent with a lagged adjustment to full pass-through and a workably competitive GB day-
ahead market, although one could argue for some evidence of modest mark-up pricing and hence
above 100% pass-through.
5.5 Trading over IFA without the CPS
During 2015–2018 the average peak (off-peak) IFA flow was 1,332 MW (1,206 MW) and the
average peak (off-peak) NTC was 1,773 MW (1,783 MW). Given the estimated SR impacts of
NTC on price differentials (PDIFA,i) in Table 3, we estimate the average instantaneous impact of
IFA flows on PDIFA,i as e−1.68/GW and e−0.29/GW for peak and off-peak, respectively.
The CPS coefficient in Table 3 shows the estimated instantaneous impact of the CPS on the
price differential. Given this, we implement the three-stage processes set out in Section 3.2 – we
first estimate the counterfact IFA price differential without the CPS, re-couple the market under
the new price differential, and re-adjust the price differential if the interconnector flow has been
changed. The actual price differential duration schedule (PDDS) curve of IFA from April 2015 to
December 201827 as well as the estimated PDDS curve without the CPS are shown in Figure A.3.
Table 6 shows the average annual (electricity year from 1 April to 31 March) GB−FR price
differential, GB annual net import, GB CPS tax revenue loss from trading, congestion income,
infra-marginal surplus, social surplus, the CPS pass-through to the cross-border market,28 and the
deadweight loss from the carbon cost distortion. The terms are defined in Section 3.1 as well as at
the bottom of the table. The difference (wherever available) between the two CPS specifications
are also listed (in the columns denoted with ∆).
As expected, the CPS has increased the GB−FR price differential, which further raised net
imports into GB. The impact of CPS on the price differential varies across years as the exchange
27Here the analysis starts from April 2015 (when the CPS moved to £18/tCO2
28The pass-through rate in section 5.4 is the CPS pass-through to the GB DAM price, while in this and the next
subsection, pass-through refers to the increase in the GB DAM price (from CPS) passes through to the cross-border
trading market, due to increases in electricity imports.
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Table 6: Statistical Measurements for IFA: with and without the CPS
Electricity GB−FR Price Diff. ( e/MWh) GB Net Import (TWh)
years £18 CPS £0 CPS ∆ £18 CPS £0 CPS ∆
2015-2016 e18.76 e8.17 e10.58 15.51 TWh 7.87 TWh 7.64 TWh
2016-2017 e8.54 − e0.42 e8.98 8.20 TWh −0.12 TWh 8.32 TWh
2017-2018 e10.49 e2.60 e7.89 11.33 TWh 0.56 TWh 10.77 TWh
Ave. e12.60 e3.45 e9.15 11.68 TWh 2.77 TWh 8.91 TWh
GB Tax Rev. Loss (m e) Congestion Income (m e)
£18 CPS £0 CPS ∆ £18 CPS £0 CPS ∆
2015-2016 m e78.39 — — m e318 m e176 m e142
2016-2017 m e66.26 — — m e198 m e155 m e43
2017-2018 m e77.01 — — m e211 m e151 m e60
Ave. m e73.89 — — m e242 m e161 m e81
Infra-marginal Surplus (m e) Social Surplus (m e)
£18 CPS £0 CPS ∆ £18 CPS £0 CPS ∆
2015-2016 m e18.36 m e15.96 m e2.40 m e336 m e192 m e144
2016-2017 m e12.52 m e12.15 m e0.37 m e211 m e167 m e44
2017-2018 m e16.81 m e15.91 m e0.90 m e228 m e167 m e61
Ave. m e15.90 m e14.68 m e1.22 m e258 m e176 m e82
CPS PT ( e/MWh) Deadweight Loss (m e)
£18 CPS £0 CPS ∆ £18 CPS £0 CPS ∆
2015-2016 − e1.72 — — m e15.67 — —
2016-2017 − e1.87 — — m e16.09 — —
2017-2018 − e2.43 — — m e23.07 — —
Ave. − e2.01 — — m e18.49 — —
GB−FR Price Diff.: the average DAM price differential between GB and FR;
GB Net Import: GB’s annual net import from France;
GB Tax Rev. Loss: GB’s loss of carbon tax revenue due to the reduced domestic electricity production;
Congestion Income: the product of the DA spot price and scheduled commercial exchange;
Infra-marginal Surplus: the consumer surplus plus the producer surplus;
Social Surplus: the infra-marginal surplus plus the congestion income;
CPS PT: the amount of CPS passed through (PT) to the cross-border market;
Deadweight Loss: deadweight loss for society due to the carbon cost distortion.
rate fell drastically after the Brexit referendum. That has an additional impact on net imports with
consequential impacts on the price differential. Perhaps unexpectedly, without the CPS, GB’s net
imports during 2016-2018 would be close to zero, as the DAM price between the two country
would be close. This can be explained by French nuclear outages in both winters of 2016 and
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2017 (see Figure 3), resulting in much higher DAM prices. During the three years, GB imported
27 TWh more electricity from France as a result of the CPS, with the loss of e222 million of
carbon-tax revenue from the reduction in GB generation displaced, or e74 million/yr.
The £18/tCO2 CPS increased congestion income by e142 million between 2015 and 2016,
by e43 million between 2016 and 2017, and by e60 million between 2017 and 2018, half
of which is transferred to the French TSO. While congestion income measures the private value
of interconnectors, the social value would be higher as it also takes infra-marginal surplus into
consideration. The estimated average infra-marginal surplus during the three years is e15.90
million with CPS or e14.68 million without, and the summation between congestion income and
the infra-marginal surplus constitutes the social surplus of the interconnector.
As the CPS raised the GB DAM price and consequently, increased net imports, market re-
coupling facilitates cross-border price convergence and partly offsets the initial impact of the CPS
on the price differential. With the CPS but without the market re-coupling, the IFA price differential
would have risen by e11.16 /MWh on average over 2015-2018. Re-coupling reduced that increase
by e2.01 /MWh (or by 18%) on average over the three years.
Deadweight losses are incurred whenever interconnector flows change as a result of the CPS, as
illustrated in Section 3.1. Assuming (locally) linear market supply curves for both GB and France,
the total deadweight loss is e55.5 million for the three years, or e18.5 million/yr.
5.6 Trading via BritNed without the CPS
We could find no freely available public data providing the day-ahead scheduled commercial ex-
change for BritNed during 2015-2018, making it challenging to estimate cross-border trading with-
out the CPS. However, under market coupling, the day-ahead NTC should be fully utilised if prices
differ, and partially used if the markets are integrated and prices are equalised (after adjusting for
the loss factor). We simulate the hourly BritNed day-ahead commercial exchange using the fol-
lowing algorithm:
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- if both the unadjusted price differential (UDF) and adjusted price differential (APD)29 are
greater (or smaller) than zero, the NTC will be fully used for importing (or exporting);
- if the APD is zero and the UPD is positive, then the day-ahead commercial exchange would
be randomly (uniformly) allocated within the interval between zero and the NTC;
- if the APD is zero and the UPD is negative, day-ahead flows would be randomly (uniformly)
allocated as a negative number between minus NTC and zero;
- if the APD and UPD have different signs, we assume the direction of flows follows that in the
previous hour, and the volume of the flow is randomly taken from the uniform distribution
between zero and the NTC.
The PDDS curve for BritNed between April 2015 and December 2018 with and without the
CPS are shown in Figure A.4.30 As with IFA, Table 7 shows the CPS increases GB−NL price dif-
ferentials, net imports and congestion income. Without the CPS, congestion income from BritNed
would fall by e62 million in 2015-2016, by e49 million in 2016-2017, and by e44 million in
2017-2018. This amount is equally shared by the Dutch and British TSOs. The impact of the CPS
on BritNed’s congestion income is more stable relative to IFA as the GB−NL price differential is
less volatile (see Figure 3). In addition to the private value (i.e. the congestion income), the social
value created by the BritNed is estimated to be around e10 m/yr higher.
More imports result in a loss of carbon-tax revenue of e87 million over the three years, or
e29 million/yr. On average, the increased imports reduced the price differential by e2.62/MWh,
or 29% of the initial impact of the CPS on GB prices (holding interconnector flows unchanged).
This is higher than IFA because the Dutch DAM price is more sensitive to interconnector flows
compared to the French DAM price, due to its smaller market size. The deadweight loss from CPS
averages e9.41 million/yr.
29Adjusted by the BritNed loss factor of 3%, see https://www.britned.com/about-us/operations/.
30During 2015–2018 the average peak (off-peak) BritNed flow was 867 MW (798 MW) and the average peak (off-
peak) NTC was 1001 MW (1006 MW). Given the estimated SR impacts of NTC on price differentials (PDBN,i) in
Table 3, we estimate the average instantaneous impact of BritNed flows on PDBN,i as e−3.79/GW and e−0.91/GW
for peak and off-peak, respectively.
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Table 7: Statistical Measurements for BritNed: with and without the CPS
Electricity GB−NL Price Diff. ( e/MWh) GB Net Import (TWh)
years £18 CPS £0 CPS ∆ £18 CPS £0 CPS ∆
2015-2016 e17.00 e9.35 e7.64 8.27 TWh 5.04 TWh 3.23 TWh
2016-2017 e15.78 e9.60 e6.19 7.85 TWh 4.26 TWh 3.39 TWh
2017-2018 e12.82 e7.36 e5.46 7.71 TWh 3.69 TWh 4.02 TWh
Ave. e15.20 e8.77 e6.43 7.94 TWh 4.33 TWh 3.61 TWh
GB Tax Rev. Loss (TWh) Congestion Income (m e)
£18 CPS £0 CPS ∆ £18 CPS £0 CPS ∆
2015-2016 e31.71 — — e148 e86 e62
2016-2017 e27.61 — — e137 e88 e49
2017-2018 e27.34 — — e113 e69 e44
Ave. e28.89 — — e133 e81 e52
Infra-marginal Surplus (m e) Social Surplus (m e)
£18 CPS £0 CPS ∆ £18 CPS £0 CPS ∆
2015-2016 m e11.64 m e9.25 m e2.39 m e160 m e96 m e64
2016-2017 m e11.20 m e9.25 m e1.95 m e149 m e98 m e51
2017-2018 m e10.76 m e8.54 m e2.22 m e124 m e78 m e46
Ave. m e11.20 m e9.01 m e2.19 m e144 m e90 m e54
CPS PT∗ ( e/MWh) Deadweight Loss (m e)
£18 CPS £0 CPS ∆ £18 CPS £0 CPS ∆
2015-2016 − e2.34 — — e8.32 — —
2016-2017 − e2.60 — — e9.38 — —
2017-2018 − e2.90 — — e10.53 — —
Ave. − e2.62 — — e9.41 — —
6 Conclusions and policy implications
Market coupling ensures the efficient use of interconnectors so that the higher-priced market al-
ways imports electricity from the lower-priced market. A unilateral carbon tax distorts trade if
it alters interconnector flows, resulting in deadweight losses. In all cases, carbon taxes transfer
revenue abroad at a cost to the domestic economy.
This paper investigated the impact of such a carbon tax on cross-border trading of electricity,
both theoretically and empirically. We provide a social cost-benefit framework showing how the
carbon tax impacts cross-border trade. Empirically, taking the British Carbon Price Floor (CPF)
with its Carbon Price Support (CPS, a tax) as a case study, we estimate the influence of the CPS
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and interconnector capacity on the price differentials between GB and its Continental neighbours
France, through IFA, and the Netherlands, through BritNed. Our results isolated the price differen-
tial that would have arisen without the CPS, allowing an estimate of interconnector flows without
the CPS. Comparing observed flows and prices (with the CPS) with this counterfactual (without
the CPS), provides a quantitative estimate of the impact of the British CPS on net imports, conges-
tion income, infra-marginal surplus, deadweight loss, and the amount of British carbon tax passed
through to the cross-border market over both interconnectors.
Our estimates do not reject the null hypothesis that in the long run the CPS has been fully
passed through to the GB day-ahead price. During electricity years 2015-2018, the CPS increased
the GB DAM price by roughly e10/MWh in the absence of trade adjustments. The actual price
differential with our neighbours fell to about e8/MWh allowing for displacement by cheaper
imports. The CPS increased imports by 8.9 TWh/yr from France and by 3.6 TWh/yr from the
Netherlands, thereby reducing carbon tax revenue by e74 m/yr from IFA and by e39 m/yr from
BritNed. Congestion income for IFA was increased by e81 million/yr and for BritNed’s by e52
million/yr, and the infra-marginal surplus from cross-border trading is around e15/m/yr for IFA
AND e10 m/yr for BritNed. The summation of congestion income and infra-marginal surplus
constitutes the social value of the interconnector. We estimated the deadweight loss due to the
CPS at e18.5 million/yr for IFA and e9.4 million/yr for BritNed. On average, about 18% of the
increase in the GB day-ahead price from the CPS has been passed through in higher French prices
and 29% in higher Dutch prices.
The results confirm that the British CPS raised the GB spot price, reduced the convergence
of cross-border electricity prices and increased GB imports of electricity. Second, the increase
in congestion income (mostly) comes from GB electricity consumers but is equally allocated to
both Transmission System Operators as owners of the interconnectors. This increased congestion
income could over-incentivise further investment in additional interconnectors, at least to carbon-
intensive markets lacking such carbon taxes. Third, as a non-negligible proportion of the GB
DAM price increase caused by the CPS was passed over the interconnectors, both French and
34
Dutch day-ahead prices have been slightly increased. That raised their producer surplus but in-
creased consumer electricity costs. Fourth, the objective of the British CPS is to reduce British
CO2 emissions and incentivise low-carbon investment, but this is partly subverted by increased
imports of more carbon-intensive electricity. (The same argument could previously be made that
reductions in GB emissions are offset by increased emissions elsewhere, but this has been largely
addressed by the Market Stability Reserve.) Finally, asymmetric carbon pricing in two connected
countries incur deadweight losses, resulting in less efficient cross-border trading.
Despite the CPS distorting cross-border electricity trading, it has significantly reduced GB’s
greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation. On 21 April 2017, GB power generation
achieved the first ever coal-free day. When the UK introduced the CPF, the hope was that other EU
countries would follow suit to correct the failures of the Emissions Trading System, at least for the
electricity sector. The case for such an EU-wide carbon price floor is further strengthened by the
desirability of correcting trade distortions.
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A Appendices
A.1 Figure Appendix
Figure A.1 shows the average daily load curves for GB, France, and the Netherlands during 2015-
2018, at Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). To facilitate comparison, we standardise each curve
by dividing its hourly loads by its maximum load.
Figure A.1: Standardised Daily Average Load Curves, 2015-2018, UTC
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Figure A.2 plots an electricity market with a convex supply curve, where during off-peak peri-
ods during which excess exports shift demand from NDOFF0 to ND
OFF
1 , the spot price decreases by
only a small amount.
 
NDOFF1 NDOFF0 NDPEAK1 NDPEAK0 
S 
Quantity 
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Figure A.2: A Market with a Convex Supply Curve
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The price differential duration schedule (PDDS) curves for IFA and BritNed, with and without
the CPS, are shown in Figures A.3 and A.4. These use unadjusted price differentials,31 so the IFA
price differentials cluster around instead of at zero.
Figure A.3: The DS Curves for IFA with Different CPS, April 2015 - December 2018
Figure A.4: The DS Curves for BritNed with Different CPS, April 2015 - December 2018
31Unadjusted for losses. See https://www.nationalgrideso.com/sites/eso/files/documents/Border Specific Annex
IFA Interconnector 0.pdf and http://ifa1interconnector.com/media/1022/ifa-loss-factor.pdf
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A.2 Table Appendix
Table A.1 presents summary statistics for day-ahead market (DAM) prices for GB, France, and
the Netherlands. The hourly data is aggregated by periods (peak and off-peak) of the day, and the
statistics presented are for the daily averaged peak and off-peak prices for each market.
Table A.1: Summary Statistics, Day-ahead Markets, 2015-2018
Variable Unit Abbr. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Peak GB DAM price e/MWh PGB,PEAK 60.06 13.16 35.75 284.01
Off-peak GB DAM price e/MWh PGB,OFF 45.96 9.39 17.3 79.48
Peak FR DAM price e/MWh PFR,PEAK 46.53 18.35 6.98 165.42
Off-peak FR DAM price e/MWh PFR,OFF 34.73 12.64 -5.02 89.61
Peak NL DAM price e/MWh PFR,PEAK 44.84 12.48 16.87 108.74
Off-peak NL DAM price e/MWh PFR,OFF 33.40 9.20 7.97 64.44
Table A.2 shows the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests on the DAM prices, all tests reject the null
of the existence of a root unit.
Table A.2: ADF Tests for DAM Prices (in e/MWh), Lags=7
Variable ADF test
Statistic P-value
Peak GB DAM price -6.039 0.000
Off-peak GB DAM price -3.434 0.047
Peak FR DAM price -5.055 0.000
Off-peak FR DAM price -5.335 0.000
Peak NL DAM price -4.133 0.006
Off-peak NL DAM price -3.714 0.022
Table A.4 shows the M-GARCH results for other covariates included in the regression. We also
test whether the impact of NTC on the price differential is independent with the CPS. We assume
the coefficients for NTC are (linear and quadratic) functions of the CPS, and likelihood ratio (LR)
tests do not reject the null hypothesis that the impact is independent with the CPS.
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Table A.3: M-GARCH Results: Mean Equations (Cont’d)
IFA Price Diff. BritNed Price Diff.
PDIFA,PEAK PDIFA,OFF PDBN,PEAK PDBN,OFF
L.PDIFA,PEAK or L.PDBN,PEAK 0.26∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
L2.PDIFA,PEAK or L2.PDBN,PEAK −0.03 −0.05∗ 0.03 −0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
L3.PDIFA,PEAK or L3.PDBN,PEAK −0.02 −0.03 0.05∗ 0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
L4.PDIFA,PEAK or L4.PDBN,PEAK 0.00 −0.02 0.01 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
L5.PDIFA,PEAK or L5.PDBN,PEAK −0.00 −0.00 0.02 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
L6.PDIFA,PEAK or L6.PDBN,PEAK 0.03 0.01 0.08∗∗∗ −0.01
(0.03) (0.02) 0.02 (0.01)
L7.PDIFA,PEAK or L7.PDBN,PEAK 0.12∗∗∗ 0.01 0.11∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) 0.02 (0.01)
L.PDIFA,OFF or L.PDBN,OFF 0.01 0.39∗∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
L2.PDIFA,OFF or L2.PDBN,OFF 0.04 −0.02∗ −0.05 0.00
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
L3.PDIFA,OFF or L3.PDBN,OFF 0.09∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.02 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
L4.PDIFA,OFF or L4.PDBN,OFF 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
L5.PDIFA,OFF or L5.PDBN,OFF 0.04 0.03 −0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
L6.PDIFA,OFF or L6.PDBN,OFF 0.04 0.08∗∗ −0.09∗∗ 0.07∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) 0.03 (0.03)
L7.PDIFA,OFF or L7.PDBN,OFF −0.03 0.05∗ 0.06 0.07∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) 0.03 (0.03)
DGB −0.57∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
DFR or DNL −0.53∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗ −0.11 −0.12∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
NGB −0.26 −0.13 −0.51∗ −0.28
(0.24) (0.19) (0.23) (0.15)
NFR or NNL 0.70∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 1.88∗ 1.28∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.80) (0.46)
SPRING 1.05 −0.37 −1.71∗∗∗ −0.79∗
(0.63) (0.51) (0.41) (0.32)
SUMMER −2.46∗∗∗ −3.26∗∗∗ −3.23∗∗∗ −1.23∗∗
(0.71) (0.60) (0.45) (0.41)
FALL −3.59∗∗∗ −4.25∗∗ −1.84∗∗∗ −0.99∗∗
(0.68) (0.53) (0.45) (0.33)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table A.4: M-GARCH Results: Conditional Variance Equations (Cont’d)
IFA Price Diff. BritNed Price Diff.
PDIFA,PEAK PDIFA,OFF PDBN,PEAK PDBN,OFF
DGB 0.07∗∗∗ 0.03 0.07∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
DFR or DNL 0.01 −0.06∗∗ −0.03 −0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
NGB −0.08∗∗∗ 0.08 −0.12 0.16
(0.02) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
NFR or NNL −0.03 −0.00 −1.11∗∗∗ 0.42
(0.03) (0.03) (0.25) (0.28)
SPRING −0.05 −0.06 0.45∗∗ −0.00
(0.24) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16)
SUMMER −0.41 −0.73∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ −0.36
(0.28) (0.24) (0.16) (0.21)
FALL −0.29 −0.79∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.24) (0.20) (0.13) (0.16)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
A.3 Cost-benefit analysis, an extension
Figure A.5 shows another case when the CPS alters the interconnector flow, where GB was initially
exporting at partial capacity, LM, and the prices of the two markets are integrated at PGB1 =P
FR
1 .
Without the interconnector the GB price would be PGB0 . The market surplus is again the producer
(GB) surplus plus the consumer (FR) surplus, HIJ, and there is zero congestion income.
The CPS shifts the GB supply curve upward from SGB0 to S
GB
C , and that switches GB from being
a net exporter to a net importer. Similar to the case in Figure 4, the deadweight loss is the triangle
HEG, which can be calculated as the half of the product of the swing of the interconnector flow,
KL, and its impact on the cross-border price differential, (PFRC −PFR1 )+(PGB1 −PPGBC ), or EG. Hence
EG/AG is the CPS pass-through rate.
The loss in carbon tax revenue is again AG×KL, and the congestion income under the CPS is
ABCE, half of which goes to the French TSO.
The final case where the CPS changes interconnector flows is shown as Figure A.6. Without
the CPS, GB was initially exporting at full capacity, KL, and the market clearing price was PGB1 for
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Figure A.5: Impact of CPS on Imports and Surpluses, GB from Exporting to Importing
GB and PFR1 for France. The market surplus is the green area HFG+ABC and the congestion income
is the red rectangular BCFH.
The CPS shifts the GB supply curve from SGB0 to S
GB
C . While still exporting, the amount GB
exported has been reduced to KM. Consequently, the deadweight loss caused by the CPS is the
shaded area BIQ+HJR, or half of the change in the interconnector flow, ML, multiplied by the
change in the price differential (due to the change in the interconnector flow), IQ+JR. The CPS PT
ratio in this case is (IQ+JR)/EG.
The loss in carbon tax revenue is ML×EG, and there is no congestion income under the CPS.
A.4 Trading in the intraday and balancing market
This section intends to prove the credibility of our simulated BritNed day-ahead scheduled com-
mercial exchange data, by comparing with the real-life data from the IFA day-ahead scheduled
commercial exchange from RTE.
46
  
 
GB Demand FR Demand 
PGB1 
PFR1 
PGBc PFRc 
SGBC 
SGB0 
SFR0 
Congestion 
revenue 
Original market 
surplus 
ND0 NDc D0 
GB Price FR Price 
A 
B C 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
Net increase 
in total cost 
K L M 
Q 
R 
PPGBc 
PGB0 
Figure A.6: Impact of CPS on Imports and Surpluses, GB Exports from Full to Partial Capacity
Differences between the day-ahead scheduled commercial exchange and the actual physical
flows are due to intraday and balancing market trading. Newbery et al. (2019a) find that GB would
rather reduce its day-ahead import from IFA in early morning hours (00:00-07:00) because the cost
of ramping fossil plants down and then up could be higher than the intraday cost of reducing its
imports, which provide a flexible and cheaper alternative. We find similar results for BritNed by
comparing the hourly averaged flows between the simulated day-ahead commercial exchange and
the actual physical flow, as demonstrated by Figure A.7.32
Our calculations shows that during the electricity year 2015-2016, an equivalent of e13 million
(4%) in IFA congestion income was retained and used to finance these reverse flows. The value
is similar for 2016-2017 ( e15 million, or 8%) and 2017-2018 ( e18 million, or 9%) despite the
non-trivial difference in yearly congestion income. For BritNed, the values are about half that for
IFA, namely e4 million (3%) for 2015-2016, e8 million (6%) for 2016-2017, and e8 million
32These are average flows, concealing relatively large (e.g. 500 MW) flows on some days and zero on others.
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Figure A.7: Day-ahead v.s. Actual BritNed Commercial Exchange, 2015-2018
(7%) for 2017-2018.
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